In Briata, Dall'Aglio and Fragnelli (2012) , the authors introduce a cooperative game with transferable utility for allocating the gain of a collusion among completely risk-averse agents involved in a fair division procedure introduced by Knaster (1946) . In this paper we analyze the features of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of the game as a measure of the players' attitude towards collusion, and we analyze this attitutude as a function of the evaluations' rankings.
Introduction
In Fragnelli and Marina (2009) the problem of manipulation and collusion in the Knaster procedure (1946) for completely risk-averse agents was posed and analyzed; later, Briata, Dall'Aglio and Fragnelli (2012) introduced a cooperative game with transferable utility, the so-called gain game, for allocating the gain of a collusion among the agents involved. In this paper we devote our attention to the computation of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of the gain game that involves all players, interpreting this as an index of the colluding power of each agent.
The collusion is a secret and fraudulent agreement among two or more agents for an illicit purpose, at damage of other ones. Auctions and sports are also not immune from collusion. For example, auctions with low minimum prices are vulnerable to collusion among bidders. Graham and Marshall (1985) study the optimal minimum price set by a seller, while Mead (1967) and Milgrom (1987) prove that ascendingbid auction is more susceptible to collusion than sealed-bid auction. The possible agreements of agents in an auction and the consequent allocation of gains is considered by Branzei et al. (2009) and Fragnelli and Meca (2010) . To avoid that judges of artistic sports collude, Federations adopt various strategies in the regulations (Gambarelli et al., 2012) . We recall that the collusive behavior is illegal. For instance, the Italian Civil Code punishes the suspected or supposed colluders. Knaster procedure (1946) allocates indivisible objects with monetary compensations in order to restore fairness: each indivisible item is first exchanged for a money amount equal to the highest valuation of it, then the monetary quantity is shared among all the agents according to their valuations. Knaster procedure is efficient (there is no other distribution that yields every agent a higher payoff), and proportional (each of the n agents thinks to receive at least one n-th of the total value), if the agents report their true valuations Taylor, 1996 and 1999) . When an agent misreports her/his valuation individually, Knaster procedure is manipulable, incurring the risk of a loss in her/his final payoff; on the other hand, Knaster procedure with infinitely risk-averse agents is non-manipulable, since there is no way of obtaining a safe gain (Fragnelli and Marina, 2009 ). Nevertheless, if two or more agents (but not all) collude, coordinating their false declarations, Knaster procedure proves to be coalition-manipulable, where a mechanism is said coalition-strategy-proof when "if a joint misreport by a coalition strictly benefits one member of the coalition, it must strictly hurt at least one other member" (Moulin, 1993) . Fragnelli and Marina (2009) remark that the gain produced by the collusion is always non-negative, but enlarging the set of colluders the gain may increase or decrease. Briata, Dall'Aglio and Fragnelli (2012) propose a dynamic allocation mechanism according to which the enlargement of the set of colluders is always non-disadvantageous, since the previous gain of the incumbent colluders is guaranteed by their altered declarations, so they secure themselves against the entrant colluders.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we recall the basic definitions of game theory, the Knaster procedure, the concept of collusion and the definition of gain game; in Section 3 we develop a closed form formula for computing the Shapley value of the game in polynomial time; Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the players' attitude towards collusion, as measured by the Shapley value; Section 5 concludes.
Notation and Basic Definitions

Elements of Game Theory
A Transferable Utility game or TU-game in characteristic function form is a pair (N, v) , where N = {1, ..., n} is a finite set of players and v : 2 N → R is a real function, with v(∅) = 0, called characteristic function. A subset S ⊂ N is called coalition and N is called grand coalition. v(S), S ⊆ N, is the worth of S, i.e. the utility that the players in S may obtain independently from the other players. A TU-game (N, v) is inessential, if v(N) = i∈N v({i}). Given a TU-game (N, v), an allocation is a vector (x i ) i∈N ∈ R n ; an imputation is an allocation such that i∈N x i = v(N) (efficiency) and x i ≥ v({i}) for each i ∈ N (individual rationality); an allocation rule is a function ψ : (N, v) → R n which assigns an allocation ψ(v) to every TU-game (N, v) in the class of games with player set N. One of the most usual rules is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) , φ, given by:
where s = |S|, the cardinality of S. An alternative equivalent formula for the Shapley value (see Hart, 1989 ) is
where Π is the set of all the permutations of the elements of N and P π i is the set of players in N which precede i in the order π. In words, the Shapley value of a player is his expected marginal contribution to a random coalition.
Knaster procedure for one object
Applying the Knaster procedure, we suppose that the value of each object obtained by an agent is independent from who has obtained the other objects (additivity), so the problem of allocating a set of objects simply corresponds to treating each object independently (private communication by Fink to Brams, mentioned in Brams and Taylor, 1996) ; this enables us to consider only a single object.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents, which we assume to be completely riskaverse, to have the same valuation of monetary quantities, and to have equal rights on the object. We suppose that agent i ∈ N knows only her/his own valuation v i of the item and does not use any statistical information on the valuations of the others. We assume also that agents are not subject to any liquidity or budget constraints. Without loss of generality, we assume that the agents are ordered according to weakly decreasing valuations, i.e. v 1 ≥ v 2 ≥ . . . ≥ v n . Once the valuations are communicated to a mediator, agent 1 gets the object for the price v 1 . Notice that even in the case of multiple maximal valuations, the transaction will involve only one agent, labelled agent 1. Exchanging the indivisible item for money makes the division possible. Each agent i ∈ N receives the expected initial fair share E i = 1 n v i , plus an equal share of the surplus S = v 1 − 1 n j∈N v j . The surplus is non-negative (Brams and Taylor, 1996) , in particular it is zero if and only if all the valuations are exactly the same (Kuhn, 1967) . The adjusted fair share or payoff of agent i ∈ N is
At the end of the allocation, the sum of the compensations in money c 1 =
, for i ∈ N \ {1} is zero, so Knaster procedure does not require or produce money (Brams and Taylor, 1996) . The solution is proportional since it secures to agent i ∈ N a portion V i ≥ 1 n v i . Knaster procedure with more than two agents does not guarantee envy-freeness, as an agent may prefer another's portion to her/his own. For instance, agent k may envy agent j, with 1 < j < k ≤ n, whenever c j > c k , i.e. v j > v k .
Collusion and gain game
Joining Propositions 1 and 2 and Definition 1 in Fragnelli and Marina (2009) and generalizing them to any number of agents, we get the following definition.
Definition 2.1. The highest safe gain of a set of agents S ⊆ N of completely riskaverse agents is obtained when they truthfully reveal their valuations to the other colluders and all the agents declare the same value b S where
The corresponding joint gain of the set of agents S is
Interpreting v g as a characteristic function, we obtain the gain game (N, v g ).
In other words, the collusion starts with a truthful revelation among the colluding agents of their valuations, then all of them declare the highest true valuation and a binding agreement guarantees their safe gain and its sharing.
Clearly v g (S) ≥ 0 for every S ⊆ N. Furthermore, v g ({i}) = 0 for every i ∈ N and v g (N) = 0, so the game is inessential. Consequently, the non-null game has no monotonicity property, either in absolute or in relative value, and the contribution of a player to a coalition can be positive, null or negative. In this situation the Shapley value is not an imputation and cannot be interpreted as the optimal division of the grand coalition payoff, since such coalition will not form. We will rather resort to the alternative interpretation of the Shapley value of a player as his expected marginal contribution to a random coalition. Recalling the efficiency of the Shapley value, i∈N φ i (v g ) = v g (N) = 0, we will broadly classify players into three classes, depending on the sign of the corresponding Shapley value: Those favoring collusion (positive value), those neutral w.r.t. it (null value), and those inhibiting it (negative value). A theoretical application is an ex-ante analysis of the profitability for an agent to participate in a colluding group, supposing we know the ex-post valuations, like an impartial external observer with complete information. The Shapley value may be viewed as an insurance against collusions, that the agents with negative values pay to the agents with positive values. Of course, from a practical point of view it is difficult to have such a complete information.
Computing the Shapley Value
In this section we present the results that allow for a quantitative analysis of the Shapley value for the gain game defined in the previous section. We will then investigate about the presence of agents with constant attitude toward collusion. It will turn out that in any instance of the game one or two players will constantly inhibit collusion and their behavior will depends only on the ranking of their evaluation, not on their absolute value.
Finding an explicit expression for the Shapley value is hampered by the fact that the marginal contribution of an agent to a coalition has a complicated espression. In fact, if i ∈ N and S ⊆ N \ {i}, the following holds
We will consider, instead, a general formula 1 about the difference of Shapley values for adjacent players
The following lemma shows that the difference between the value of the coalition joined by two successive players results in a formula much simpler than (2). For any j ∈ N \ {n}, let J = {1, . . . , j} and J c = {j + 1, . . . , n}.
Lemma 3.1. For any j ∈ N \ {n} and S ⊂ N \ {j, j + 1},
Proof. The two cases are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. If S ⊂ J c \ {j + 1}, then
We will thus be able to express the Shapley value of the gain game as linear combination of the differences between adjacent players.
where, for each j ∈ N \ {n}
and c(n, j) = 2n − 3j − j 2 2n 2 (j + 1)(j + 2)
1 Private communication with Stefano Moretti. It can be easily verified.
The following combinatorial result is needed to prove the theorem. 
Proof. Let us start by proving (7) by induction on t. It is trivially true for t = 1. Assume now it is true for t, let us show that it is true for t + 1. Indeed
by the induction hypothesis. This is precisely (7) with t + 1 replacing t.
We now prove (8), again by induction on t. Since the formula is trivial for t = 1, let us assume it holds for t. Then, reasoning as above,
which, using (7) and the induction hypothesis, gives t+1 s=1 s t+1 s j+t+1 s = t + 1 t + j + 1 1 + t (j + t + 1) (j + 1)(j + 2) + t j + 1 = (t + 1) (j + t + 2) (j + 1)(j + 2) .
This completes the proof of the Lemma.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. The value of each coalition in the gain game is a linear combination of the differences in valuations between successive agents. Therefore, also the Shapley value is linear in the same terms, explaining (5). The gain game is such that v g (N) = 0 and, therefore,
Since this holds for any choice of the v i , i ∈ N, it must be that i∈N ψ ij = 0 for any j ∈ N \ {n}.
In order to have a simple expression for the coefficients ψ ij we introduce a particular set of evaluation for the agents, and then we consider the related gain game. For any j ∈ N \ {n}, let the evaluations be as follows:
Let v g,j be the corresponding gain game. Clearly, from (5) we have:
Moreover, by the symmetry 2 of the players in J and in J c , and recalling that the Shapley value assigns equal amounts to symmetric players we have
To compute every ψ ij we only need to determine the differences between ψ jj and ψ j+1,j , which we can write as:
We now apply Lemma (3.1). Noting that v j − v j+1 = 1 in the game v gj , the Lemma distinguishes between two cases:
The part of formula (3) pertaining these coalitions is present only when j ∈ N \ {n − 1, n} and it is given by
The part of formula (3) pertaining this case is given by
Now, we can choose a set of s units, with at least 1 unit from the first j − 1 in a number of ways given by
Therefore, the part of (3) pertaining this case becomes
Joining the results for Case 1 and Case 2 when j < n − 1, we have
Applying Lemma 3.3 to the r.h.s. of (13), it is easy to check that
To prove (6) we recall (9), (11) and solve the following system of linear equations in the variables a j and
Let us denote by v = (v j − v j+1 ) T j∈N \{n} the vector of differences between adjacent evaluations, and by Ψ, the n × (n − 1) matrix of the linear coefficients for the Shapley value. According to Theorem 3.2, the j-th column in Ψ has null sum, and its first j elements all equal to each other, as well as its last n − j elements, with a gap between the two groups of coefficient given by
Also, note that statement (5) can be expressed with matricial notation as (15) i.e. n − 1 steps; then it is necessary to compute two values for each column corresponding to the closed formula (6), i.e. 2(n − 1) steps; and finally, the scalar product Ψ · v requires O(n 2 ) operations. Thus the overall computational complexity is O(n 2 ).
Example 3.5. Consider a situation with 5 agents whose evaluations of the object are 10, 6, 3, 2, 1, respectively. The values of the differences according to (15) are: T . Note that if the evaluations of the object were 10, 9, 8, 4, 1, respectively, the matrix Ψ would be the same, while v = (1, 1, 4, 3)
T and the Shapley value would be φ(v g ) = (−0.020, −0.120, −0.120, 0.040, 0.220) T , i.e. the signs for players 1, 4, 5 would change, while players 2 and 3 would again be negative.
Constant attitude towards collusion
According to Theorem 3.2, the Shapley value depends primarily on the ranking position of the agent evaluation. We will now show that players in the extreme positions in the ranking play a preminent role in the colluding process when compared to the intermediate ones. Moreover, the attitude of some players towards collusion may (and in fact will) be constant, once the ranking of the players is determined.
Example 3.5 (Continued). For any determination of the evaluations, the Shapley value for players 2 and 3 will be non-positive and identical, since they are given by the scalar product of corresponding identical non-positive rows in the matrix Ψ with the non-negative vector v. It is easy to verify that each time we move up or down from rows 2 and 3, a negative coefficient of the row turns positive, implying an increase in the Shapley value of the corresponding player.
We now investigate the presence of players whose attitude towards collusion is determined exclusively by the ranking position of the corresponding evaluation.
Definition 4.1. Player i is
• Strongly (Weakly) collusion prone w.r.t. any specification of the evaluations compatible with the given ranking if ψ ij > 0 (ψ ij ≥ 0) for every j ∈ N \ {n}
• Strongly (Weakly) collusion averse w.r.t. any specification of the evaluations compatible with the given ranking if ψ ij < 0 (ψ ij ≤ 0) for every j ∈ N \ {n} Example 3.5 showed that in the case of n = 5 agents, agents 2 and 3 are weakly collusion averse, and their common Shapley value is a global minimum for φ j (v g ) in the variable j, since in the other rows of Ψ one or more negative coefficients turn positive. Also, there is no collusion prone player in the same situation.
A thorough examination of similar situations involving small number of agents, reveals the constant presence of collusion averse players (weakly or strongly).
Example 4.2. If we denote with a "+", "0" or a "−" a positive, null or negative coefficient in Ψ for the cases with n = 2 players through n = 6 players, we find the following evidence
When n = 2, both players are simultanously weakly averse and weakly prone (actually the Shapley value for both is always null). Starting from n = 3 there never exists a collusion prone agent, while there exists at least a collusion averse one. In the case n = 5 there are two weakly averse players (as already seen in Example 3.5), while there is a single strongly collusion averse one in all the other cases. In any case, the Shapley value reaches a minimum at the collusion averse player(s). The alternation between one strongly averse player and two weakly averse ones is confirmed by the computation of the coefficients' signs up to n = 15 players in Table  1 . Note that the gap between the cases with two weakly averse players always increases by one, and these occurrences mark a change in position of the strongly averse player in all the other occurences (i.e. the gaps between these occurrences), so that the averse players form a "ladder" pattern in the table.
According to the pattern in Table 1 , two weakly averse players are present when n 2 = 2, when n 3 = 2 + 3 = 5 and, in general when for some k ≥ 2
The general pattern is confirmed by the following theorem. The pattern of doomed players: strongly (weakly, resp.) doomed players are indicated by ⊗ (⊙, resp.) Pl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 2 ⊙ ⊙ 3
with n k defined in (17), then players k and k+1 are weakly collusion averse, and their Shapley value coincide;
If, instead n k < n < n k+1 (19) then, player k + 1 is the only strongly collusion averse player; b) If n = 2 both players are simultaneously weakly collusion averse and prone, while for n > 2 there is no collusion prone players;
c) The Shapley value is decreasing in the agent, from player 1 up to the first collusion averse player, and is increasing in the agent from the last collusion averse player up to player n.
Proof. When n = 2. Here Ψ = [0, 0] T and both players are simultaneously weakly collusion prone and averse, satisfying both a) (with k = 1) and b).
When n > 2, the sign of the gap ψ jj − ψ j+1,j depends exclusively on the term 2n − 3j − j 2 . Now the quadratic function −x 2 − 3x + 2n in the real variable x has a positive root
so that the function is positive before the root and negative after it. The root is an integer if and only if n = (k 2 + 3k)/2 for some integer k > 1. We therefore distinguish between two cases i) n = n k for some k > 1. Here x * = k and the gap
leading to the following sign structure for the matrix
Therefore players k and k + 1 (with bold typeface in the matrix) will be weakly collusion averse, while no player will be collusion prone, since every row has at least a "−" element. Also, rows k and k + 1 are identical, leading to the same Shapley value for the corresponding players.
ii) If n k < n < n k+1 for some k ≥ 1, then k < x * < k + 1 and the gap ψ jj − ψ j+1,j is > 0 if j ≤ k < 0 if j ≥ k + 1 , leading to the following sign structure for the matrix 
and player k + 1 (with bold typeface in the matrix) is strongly collusion averse, while no player will be collusion prone.
To prove c) note that in both (20) and (21), each time we move up or down from the rows in Ψ corresponding to collusion averse players, a "−" element is turned into "+", increasing the Shapley value of the corresponding player.
Remark 4.4. When n = 2 the Shapley value of both players is null, while if n = n k for some integer k > 1, the Shapley value of all players is null if the evaluations of the first k players coincide and those of the last n − k players coincide too.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we dealt with the explicit computation of the Shapley value for the gain game introduced in Briata, Dall'Aglio and Fragnelli (2012) , and its consequences to the players'attitude towards collusion in the Knaster fair division procedure. The Shapley value can be obtained as the matrix product among a matrix whose entries depend only on the number of agents and the vector of the differences in the valuations of the agents.
Further researches may deal with the analysis and computation of other classical game theoretical solutions, comparing them on the basis of their characterizing properties.
